More on Tattvavada

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Introduction

Any doctrine, more so a philosophical one, is obliged to have some utility, for it to carry some worth. This utility has to be justified on rational grounds without any dependence on the beliefs of the day. Consider the case of soul as an entity different from the body. Unless this is proven, all spiritual pursuits would hardly have any utility. Despite this concept having a wide acceptance (excepting the chArvakas), Srimad Acharya takes sufficient care to establish the same on reason, rather than on dogmatic assertions.

In his first work, Gita Bhashya, Srimad Acharya brings up this subject when commenting on the verses 2.12 and 2.13 of Gita. The soul as different from the body needs to be postulated because while the body changes, the experiencer/observer of these changes, i.e. this ‘I’ does not. Also, the qualities that the soul is supposed to have cannot exist in this body that has opposing qualities. The soul is said to have ‘jnAna (knowledge), ichChA (desire), kriyA (activity, initiative), which the body, rather a dead body, does not possess. (This is Ramanuja’s argument. See his commentary on Gita, 2.10). But, why shouldn’t it be held that some part of the body that is not changing unlike the rest of it is the experiencer? Why shouldn’t it be held that some part of the body, to be precise, the brain or mind who is responsible for the above qualities? Why shouldn’t it be that it is the mind that is the experiencer who also ‘dies in death’?
The reply lies in analysis of the states of ‘mUrccha’ (unconscious state) and in dreamless sleep (suShupti). There is no experience (of ‘I’-ness), though the brain is active. So, the experiencer is somebody else and that is the jIva. Mind is like a ‘tool’ (stores information), not to be confused with the ‘user/experiencer of the information’.

Pramaanaas

Tattvavada states that there are three (aNu) pramANAs (sources of knowledge) – flawless perception, flawless inference annd flawless verbal testimony. The bhATTAs and advaitins have three more pramANas, but those are shown to be special cases of inference.

In the last category, the Vedas, Mahabharata, Mula-ramayana (different from Valmiki Ramayana) and Pancharatraas are held as authoritative.

The Vedas are the primary authority while others derive authority on the account of being ancillary to the Vedas. The Vedas are authoritative because they are apaurusheya (unauthored).
The very concept of apaurusheyatva i.e., unauthoredness cannot be held illogical. In the absence of such unauthored works, no certain and firm knowledge about entities such as dharma, adharma or even God can be obtained.
These entities deserve attention because by definition, they are ‘atIndriya’ (imperceptible through sensory organs). The limitations of scope of human sensory organs should prevent hasty opinions such as, ‘If God exists, let Him be visible’. Moreover it is preposterous to insist for their perception when they are ‘supra-sensory’ by definition. This is true of all of them; dharma and adharma, heaven and hell.

Coming back, it is that ‘atIndriya’ entities need unauthored scriptures to establish them firmly.

  1. God and other such entities cannot be established just on the basis of logic. This is because every logical proposition in favour of existence of God can be countered by an equally, if not more, powerful one.
  2. Dharma or adharma should not be assumed. Statements such as “God wants me to be happy. And if I have to be happy, I should have a feast on Ekadasi” cannot be simply made. When nobody even knows what God is, how can His assent over our activities be ascertained?
  3. Considering that these entities don’t exist at all is of no use to anybody. (Here, the basic consideration is that any religion or philosophy should be beneficial to the aspirant.) Propagation of non-existence of absolute morals (dharma) would, ofcourse, result only in chaos and anarchy. The commonly heard ideals of morality in terms of not harming others or doing good to ‘mankind’ are subjective. With such, one would land up in an absurd situation of not punishing criminals who commit crime for the sake of sustaining oneself or for the sake of reducing population growth. Only non-human-made entities like dharma/adharma possess such absoluteness. Hence they should be accepted.
    But then, just because acceptance of dharma/adharma would bring in utility, it does not mean they exist. Just that a person is thirsty does not mean water exists somewhere. Here it should be understood that the arguments made so far are not meant to contend that atIndriya padarthas do exist for sure. Instead they are directed towards such doctrines, which contend that they do not exist for sure and when the same is preached, people will benefit from non-observance of unnecessary rituals.
    On the other hand, it is that their existence can be doubted at least. In addition, one should realize the limitations of the abilities of our senses. Eyes can only see and but not taste. Ears can only hear, but cannot smell. Given such, it is quite possible that there are entities beyond the grasp of these senses. (This is not a proof, but an observation).
  4. The significance of the adjective ‘unauthored’ is that authored works, however great the author may be, cannot be taken as authority on the account of possibility of the authors being ignorant or deceitful. Omniscience as such cannot be proven. It is not possible to know that some other person is omniscient when oneself is not so. Also, for authored sentences to be useful, additional assumptions such as absence of intention of deceit, willingness to give out the knowledge and more importantly, capability of doing the same, need to be done. Even considering God as the author of the vedas would not reduce the number of assumptions.

On the other hand, there is nothing to be assumed if one accepts apaurusheyatva. Apaurusheyatva implies flawlessness. The flaws in a sentence arise solely because of the author. Words as such are not flawed. It’s only the ignorance or other intentions of the composer that bring in flaws. Thus authorless sentences have no flaws.

Apaurusheyatva is proven by itself, only, i.e., no other pramANa can prove it. It’s validity is inherent in the knowledge, like any other valid knowledge (See the section of svataH prAmANya). Here, it should be understood that the Vedas have a special quality as being “known not to have any authors/creators”. Note that this quality is different from “authors/creators are not known”. It is only the Vedas (and other eternal entities) that fall in the first category, while folk songs and other anonymous literature come under the second category. For the entities in the first category, knowledge of lack of authors was present at all points of time. It is eternal. Such a quality cannot be attributed to any entity ‘over a period of time’. Whereas, for the entities in the second category, where there is lack of knowledge of authors, such a quality is temporal and cannot be said true in all past.

The possibility of spurious and secretive works attaining the status of apaurusheyatva is rejected on the basis of another quality of Vedas: an unbroken sequence of study by a student from a teacher. Secretly composed works lack this quality. And to filter out ordinary people claiming to have seen the Vedas and thus spurious works getting the status of scriptures, the qualities of a mantra-draShTa (seer of a Vedic mantra) are mentioned on the basis of from Brahmanda purana. Every mantra has three entities attached to it — Rishi, chandas and devatA. The Rishi is the seer, Chandas the meter and devata, the presiding deity of the mantra. This information should also help in the contention that the Vedas obtained the status of unauthoredness over time, though actually these Rishis are the authors. The fallacy becomes obvious when one works backward in time. If the Rishi were himself to be the author and known as such, it is unreasonable to expect that the concept of apaurusheyatva (which, according to the contenders, is chronologically at a later date to the mantras) could have gained momentum. Would, after, say 2000 years, Kalidasa be considered as the Rishi of ‘Meghadoota’ and not its author?

Karma-Kanda and Jnana-Kanda?

Mimamsakas give more weight to Karma-kANDa, while Advaita gives more importance to jnAna kANDa. However, it holds that even within the jnAna-kANDa, there are two types of statements; one set that eulogizes Brahman as possessing excellent qualities and the other set that speaks of Brahman as ‘nirguNa’ i.e., bereft of any qualities. The latter convey the ‘actual truth’ and give moxa directly, while the former talk of ’empirical truth’ (something which is true for present, but which will be proven as false upon dawn of knowledge at a later date) and are said to grant moxa, albeit indirectly.
Obviously, Such partitions have their basis in unwarranted presumptions about actual nature of truth. Even a scriptural statement encouraging such a division cannot be relied on, for, it is equivalent to a slight variant of the liar’s paradox (and also of Russell’s paradox), “Only statements A, B, C are true”. Thus, we have nothing but the words of the proponents of Advaita as the proof that only the above statements lead to moxa directly.
On the other hand, Tattvavada hold all statements in the shruti to be of equal importance. All portions of the Vedas, including the karma-kANDa, primarily, give knowledge of the Supreme Being.

Srimad Acharya attributes ‘conditional authority’ to all ancillary texts such as the smritis, purANAs, itihAsa (mahabharata). They are considered authoritative as long as they do not contradict the Vedas.
Priorities of pramANAs: Each pramANA has a particular scope and domain, within which it can be considered a pramANa. Pratyaksha (perception) can function as a pramANa in the matters of perceptible entities. It has to subscribe to the shruti in the matters of atIndriya (supra-sensory) entities like God, dharma and adharma. Likewise, Shruti cannot overrule experience.

“na cha anubhavavirodhe Agamasya prAmANyaM”

On the other hand if shruti directs that the emotions and feelings experienced have to be considered illusory or that they will be proved so later, the shruti has to be either summarily discarded or interpreted in some other way.

Validity of knowledge

It should be noted that it is only ‘flawless’ pratyaksha, inference and verbal testimony that are considered as ‘pramANa’. This flawlessness implies validity of knowledge obtained through these sources.

How is this ‘flawlessness’ determined? One might enumerate all the conditions that are necessary for flawlessness, but how does one know if the cognitions on whether these ‘conditions’ are met are flawless themselves?

The usual ‘scientific’ method of instituting a test to determine the validity of certain cognition (or perception) suffers from the same flaw; the accuracy (validity) of the test needs to be separately apprehended with the aid of yet another test. Thus, testing is not reliable when ‘absolute validity’ is the want.

Related questions are regarding “when” and “who” with respect to validity and ‘knowledge of validity’. When is this validity obtained? Is it obtained in the same cognition or in another cognition, for which the ‘cognizer’ has to wait? And most importantly, who recognizes this validity? There has to be some agency to ‘receive’ and cognise even the validity itself. Is it the soul or some other organ, like the mind, which is susceptible to error? The need for the existence of an entity cannot be undermined; for whatever be the doctrine, dvaita or advaita or atheism, there has to be some entity that will validate it. How do we know that all these theories are stable and hold good always unlike science, whose understanding of the world changes with time?

Tattvavada answers thus: Validity is intrinsic to the knowledge; i.e., knowledge and its validity are, both, cognised in the same cognition. If it were the contrary, i.e., if validity were to be ‘conveyed’ in some other cognition, as it would happen in case of tests determining the validity, one would land up with infinite regress.

Note that it is not that validity has never been apprehended at all. Consider the case of knowledge of self, ‘I-ness’. This is known as valid and so, at all times. Never was a test instituted to verify whether ‘I-ness’ exists or not.

Given the possibility of unerring knowledge being cognized, Tattavada considers ‘sAkshi’ (loosely translated as witness), which is nothing but the soul, as the cognising agent. Definitely it is not the mind or brain that can be held responsible for grasping the validity of particular knowledge, because the mind does not grasp the invalidity in erroneous perceptions. The introduction of this concept of ‘sAkshi’ is one of the important contributions to philosophy.

The role of the ‘sAkshi’ can be seen even in general scientific way of ‘testing’, where certain knowledge is understood to be valid without undertaking infinite tests. At one point of time, one understands the validity of test itself without having to perform another test. That itself is a proof that knowledge (obtained from the test) and its validity (of the test) are known in the same instance itself unless ‘blocked’.

In certain instances when there are obstructions, sAkshi comprehends only the knowledge and not its validity. These obstructions are due to various flaws like that of mind, like greed, expectations, agitation, doubt; or the situation itself: too far from the object of perception etc. Once these obstructions are removed, the validity is also cognised.

Once ‘approved’ as valid by the sAkshi, such knowledge can never be sublated or negated, even later. For example, no amount of logic or any future experience can ever sublate the knowledge of one’s own experience of happiness at a certain point of time.

Tenets of Tattvavada

1. Vishnu is Supreme (Vishnu sarvottamatva)

The first and foremost tenet is that of the absolute independence of Vishnu, who is set apart from everything else on the basis of this quality. Thus, we have two categories, independent and dependent. Thus dvaita talks of svatantra and paratantra, unlike the dualism of Western philosophy, which speaks of mind and matter as the two separate reals. Also, dvaita has been generally spoken of as constituting two reals; which is not the case. Dvaita holds not one or two entities to be real, but many of them, each of them dependent on one Supreme real, Sri Narayana (or Vishnu or Hari), who, the Katha Upanishad praises as the ‘real of reals’.

Vishnu is the Supreme Lord and knowable only with the aid of the flawless scriptures. He has infinite virtues, each virtue itself being infinite in magnitude (Defining God is not limiting him. After all, saying, ‘Infinite cannot be comprehended completely’ does not make infinite finite). He experiences infinite untarnished bliss, possesses knowledge of everything to the last detail, has energy and powers that are beyond the limits of thought of the greatest human intellect. He is never touched even by the slightest blemish such as misery, dependence etc. He is never comprehensible completely by anybody except Himself. He is the only independent being who exercises complete, absolute and thorough control over all aspects of all souls and insentient matter at all points of time.

It is not a sectarian impulse but a dispassionate reading that drives the conclusion of Vishnu’s supremacy. The Supremacy of others can only arise by special pleadings and fallacious reasoning that identifies all deities as one and the same, etc. It is not that a convenient lot is picked from the scriptures to decide on Vishnu’s supremacy. Srimad Acharya says such is the purport of the entire Vedas. While other gods are also praised, Vishnu is the primary referent of all words (and sounds). Aitereya Aranyaka and Upanishad are important sources for this concept. Sri Madhva explains this concept in detail in his Brahma-sutra-bhAShya and shows how a beatific harmonization of all scriptural (even seemingly self-contradictory) statements can be done to conclude the unconditional supremacy of Lord Vishnu only.

Brahman indicates Vishnu only

While the scriptures, on the face of it, seem to praise many gods like Rudra (Sri Rudram), Indra, Agni (many places in the Vedas), certain important ones indicate that it is only ONE being who existed prior to creation, the One extolled as the ‘bearer’ of all names(like ‘yo devAnAM namadhA eka eva’). Also, the nAsadIya sukta and many Upanishads are very clear that there is a single being who is the source of the rest.

This Being is Brahman, i.e., Vishnu. Sri Madhva identifies Brahman with Lord Narayana on the basis of ‘linga’ (indicative marks). In this regard, the following three quotes are significant:

  • The ‘ambhraNI sUkta’ (from RgVeda) where the deity speaks of her prowess in making a person brahma, Rudra or a sage or a wise man, as she pleases. It is her who makes ‘Rudra cut off the head of Brahma’. At the end of it, she indicates the source of powers to be ‘the Being on the ocean’.
  • Bhallaveya shruti says, “nAmAni sarvAni yamAvishanti taM vai vishhNuM paramamudAharanti”, which extols Vishnu is the Supreme Being who is primarily and invariably conveyed by all the words.
  • The RkSamhita talks of the worlds as being present in a lotus which itself is in the navel of the ‘unborn’ — ‘ajasya nAbhaAvadhyekamarpitaM yasminvishvA bhuvanAni tasthuH’

The speciality of these quotes is such qualities that identify Vishnu uniquely AND that are known generally, are mentioned.

Why not Rudra or Indra or other gods?

The first quote is an important one, for it answers many objections to Supremacy of Vishnu. In Sri Rudram, Rudra is praised as Supreme Lord. The referent therein is also praised with indicative marks such as, ‘neelakaNTa’ (blue-necked). Thus it must be Shiva who is the Supreme — such can be an objection. The answer to this lies in the first quote. More than verses extolling the devatas individually, this verse is important because it brings Lakshmi, Brahma and Rudra in its scope and compares them. Sri Lakshmi is said to bestow on him, his very qualities of Rudratva and she acknowledges her power to be the ‘Being on the Ocean’. A similar occurrence is in RgVeda.7th —

asya devasya mILhuSo vayA viSNoreSasya prabhRthe havirbhiH |
vide hi rudro rudriyaM mahitvaM yAsiShTaM vartirashvinAvirAvat ||

Thus Sri Rudram has to be interpreted in a different way (with Vishnu as the antaryAMi of Shiva) to suit the meaning of ambhraNi-sukta and not changing the interpretation of ambhraNi-sUkta to suit Sri Rudram.

The interpretation of the RgVedic sentence (ekam sad viprA bahudhA vadanti” The wise refer to the one Brahman in many ways) has to note that there are other Vedic sentences that assert the different deities to be afraid of the Supreme Brahman (R.V 2.38.9, Taittiriya Upanishad 2-8). Thus, it is also not the case that the gods mentioned in the above verse are different parts or forms of Brahman. They are different from Him and need Him for their powers. This is precisely what the Upanishads seek to convey; on His being present in Aditya (Sun), Vayu (wind) and controllers of elements found in nature.

The word ‘Atma’

While the word is generally interpreted as ‘self’ (referring the jIva), Srimad Acharya takes the context into account and interprets it (mostly) as Lord Narayana.

According to Brahmasutra 1.3.1, the being that is the support of this entire cosmos is the referent of the word ‘Atma’. Interestingly, even Shankaracharya while commenting on the same says that the word ‘Atma’ primarily refers to the Paramatma and not the jIva. Moreover, it is opposed to experience that the individual Jiva can be the support of the cosmos. And even Advaita accepts that ‘hundred shrutis cannot make a crow white or fire cold’.

See in this regard the statement in Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad — yo Atmani tiShThan AtmAnaM antaro yamayati, esha te atmA — He who is in the ‘Atma’ and controls the ‘Atma’ from within is the antaryAmi; He is your ‘AtmA’ (mAdhyandina shAkhA, antaryAmi brAhmaNa). This is a good example to note that the conventional meaning of the word, Atma, does not hold well always.

Sri Lakshmi

She is the Eternal consort of Sri Narayana and the presiding deity of the entire insentient matter. She possesses an indestructible and extremely subtle body (axara). She is also untouched by blemishes such as misery. However she is not independent and is considered the best devotee of the Lord.

What role does the Lord play in creation?

The Lord is the creator, preserver and destroyer and dispenser of other functions of the universe. He is only an efficient cause in the creation, i.e., that He is like a potter who does not transform Himself to create a pot; instead creates a pot out of clay, without Himself not undergoing any modification. Obviously, a sentient being cannot transform itself into an insentient entity with totally contradictory attributes.

The example of scorpions rising from the clay (given in Shankaracharya’s Brahmasutrabhashya) does not hold water, for, the clay itself does not transform itself into give birth to scorpions. And the verse in the muNDaka Upanishad (yathorNanAbhiH sR^ijate gR^ihNate cha: 3 instances given here, a spider spinning its web, the plants sprouting from earth and the hair rising from a man) only make it clear how the sentient being does not transform itself (i.e. it’s sentience) to produce insentient effects.

The equivalent of clay in creation is the mUla prakriti — insentient matter, out of which the universe is created and into which the universe dissolves. Creation is only modification of this prakriti, from its subtle state to more manifested grosser evolutes. The ever-benevolent Lord undertakes this creation because it is his nature to create. He has nothing to benefit from this creation; for, what can a Being that has nothing left to be fulfilled ever want (AptakAmasya kA spriha)? The Brahmasutras say that this world has been the created for the benefit of worthy souls (and this is the expression of Lord’s benevolence).

2. Reality of world

The world is real because there is no pramANa either (i) contradicting it or (ii) supporting the contrary.

Pratyaksha (perception) does not deny the reality of this world. Unlike the illusory experiences of rope-snake or silver in the nacre, where there is a sublating knowledge revealing the correct knowledge, nobody has ever had the experience of world being illusory, despite hoards of advaitins being extremely vociferous about it.

Inferences concluding the illusoriness are shown to be faulty. Such are of the nature, ‘This world is ‘mithya’ on the account of it being perceived, being limited etc, just like the silver in the nacre’ (Shankaracharya on Gaudapada karika, 2.4). Srimad Acharya points out twelve different fallacies; one being as simple as the possibility of formulation of a stronger and opposing syllogism – The world is real, for it is perceived. Moreover, ‘Atman’, the ultimate goal of Advaita, has to be perceptible else how would one know whether the goal has been achieved or not. If it is conceded as perceptible, it also should be held illusory.

Another argument found in the Gaudapada karikas is the analogy of dream-world and waking state. Since the spatio-temporal restrictions of waking state are overruled in dream state, the dream objects have to be unreal. Also, what is the essential difference in the objects perceived in the dream state and that in the wakeful state: Both have similar qualities of temporary-ness, limitedness etc. It is only that the illusion about dream objects is corrected more quickly than the illusion of objects seen in wakeful state.

The fallacy in this argument is this: To derive the unreality of dream objects, a presumption about reality of wakeful state (and the rules thereof) is done. In the absence of such a presumption, unreality of dream objects can never be inferred. On this inference, another deduction is made which negates the very presumption! Giving up the presumption would remove the very basis of inference of unreality of dream objects.

Tattvavada holds that the dream objects are real. Everybody agrees that they are a remix and replay of one’s vAsanas(impressions) of the mind. Unlike illusory objects, they do have a real causal substance, i.e, vAsana. Just like one watching a movie reacts to the characters seen on screen, the dreamer also reacts ‘confounding’ an equality between the objects seen in dream vis-a-vis corresponding objects in the wakeful state. Just as the screen, the light falling on it, its movements, are not unreal; even so the dream objects. The restrictions of wakeful state need not obviously apply to a screenplay.

Also scriptures oppose the concept of unreality of world – vishvam satyam (RgVeda) and in Gita, 16.8 (where it is said that demonic people consider this world to be ‘asatyam’). Even the Mandukya Upanishad verses, ‘prapaNcho yadi vidyeta nivarteta’ do not support the illusoriness of the world. After all, a few verses earlier, among the various theories of creation (including that which considers the world to be an illusion), the one that accepted this world to have been created by Lord merely by His will was praised as being ‘decisive’. And even the magician’s example given by Shankara in his MandukyaBhashya is inappropriate where he says that this world is like a magician’s creation. While a magician does not see his own creation, the same is not true of our creator, the Lord (Refer the Ishavasya Upanishad) who is very much aware of it. Moreover, if Lord were to be a magician, the shruti ‘tat shriShTvA tad anupraviShat’ (He created that and entered that!) will become nonsensical!

Eternality cannot be same as reality

The basic flaw is that these doctrines confuse ‘reality’ to ‘eternality’. Their argument in short is this: Given the illusory experience of a snake in the rope, how does one characterize the real? How is it different from the unreal? How does one know that the objects perceived at present are real and will not vanish later? It is only such objects that never vanish or rather; such that always exist is real. A corollary of this is that anything changes is not real.

Ofcourse, the point missed here is that even the ‘real’ rope was not perceived when the snake was perceived. So, does that make the rope unreal? If anything, the rope and snake should be equally unreal. Also, contrast the after-reactions in the cases of perception of illusory silver and a situation where an article, say a silver vessel, has been displaced when the observer was not looking. If ‘non-eternality’ were to be the criterion for unreality, the responses in both the situations must have been identical, which is hardly the case.

In addition, the difficulty of explaining how the imperceptible ‘nirguNa Brahman’ as the ultimate reality needs to be addressed. But if it were to be said that nirguNa Brahman exists always, though not perceived, the criterion for reality has to be changed; i.e., that which exists, even if not always, is real.

Then there is the theory that the illusoriness of this world will be known after more knowledge is obtained. That one is in illusion when perceiving the snake cannot be known while in the illusion itself. But after the sublating knowledge of the rope is obtained, the snake (in this case the world) is no more perceived.

The problem with this theory is that the source of this sublating knowledge cannot be determined. Even the scriptures cannot help since they are in the domain of this illusory world. Secondly, what is the nature of this sublating knowledge? Unlike in the rope-snake scenario (where the sublating knowledge is of the form, ‘This real rope is the substratum of unreal snake’), the knowledge cannot be of the form, ‘This Atman is the substratum of this world-illusion’, for the Atman is not only imperceptible (even to itself), but that there is no perceiving agent to perceive. Thirdly, by the same theory there is no guarantee that this theory would hold good forever.

Why is the world real:

According to TattvavAda, that is real which is an object of valid cognition and is not superimposed. The snake in the rope is not real because it is superimposed. The water in a mirage is unreal because certain factors contribute to making the cognition invalid. In simpler words, all that glitters is not gold. On the other hand, the rope is real because it is not superimposed. The reality of rope can stand further examination and is known through uncorrupted experiences.

It is here that the role of sAkshi in ascertaining the validity of these examinations itself. When there are no obstacles to knowledge, such as similarity between silver and the seashell, the sAkshi is capable of comprehending the validity of knowledge. And since it is the sAkshi, whose ‘approval’ is irrefutable, that validates the reality of world the question of some other knowledge sublating the world later doesn’t arise.

Ofcourse, it is the untamed conditioned mind, which has other hindrances like greed, anxiety, that triggers the actions upon the perception of unreal objects. This mind, which is a major factor in our responses, is the main culprit and not the sAkshi, which is the ‘witness’ to these misperceptions. Reflexive actions, ignorance of body movements in sleep and examples of involuntary actions prove that all the actions are not necessarily driven by the soul (and that the soul is different from mind/brain).

To summarize, this world is real because there is no pramANa opposing it or supporting the contrary. And it has been the object of many a flawless perception. Just that there are perceptions of unreal entities does not make the world unreal.

3. Souls:

There are infinite souls, uncreated essentially and eternal. Each is atomic in size and ever dependent on the Lord for its ‘sattApratItipravR^itti’ (i.e., existence, knowledge and activities).
There is a gradation among the souls and it is seen not only in the sAdhana performed but also in the intrinsic knowledge possessed and intrinsic bliss experienced by a soul in moksha. The souls are bound from beginningless time and have beginning-less ignorance about the Lord and their own selves. The Lord in accordance with the souls’ instrinsic nature and anAdi karmas guides the souls through their spiritual journey. Their intrinsic nature is fixed and does not change. Never does the soul lose its individuality.

Panchabheda

jIveshvara bhidA chaiva jaDeshvara bhidA tathA
jIvabhedo mithashchaiva jaDajIvabhidA tathA
mithashcha jaDabhedo.ayam prapancho bhedapaNchakaH || (from the paramashruti)

The difference between the jIva and the Lord, between jaDa (insentient) and the Lord, the difference between various jIvas, the difference between jaDa and jIva and the difference between various jaDas (like sattva, rajas and tamas) — these are the five differences that make up the universe.

These differences never get sublated or submerged into each other. Plain experience justifies this theory in this world. Scriptural statements like ‘amritasyaiSha setuH’ (He is the ‘bridge’ to moksha), ‘so.ashnute sarvAn kAmAn saha brahmaNA’ (enjoys along with the Brahman) and “sveNa rUpeNAbhiniShpadyata” rule out merging of a jIva with the Brahman or other jIvas in liberation.

The souls are of three kinds: mukti-yogya (who are fit for liberation), nitya-samsaarinaH (ever transmigrating) and tamo-yogya (damnable). This categorization is based on intrinsic yogyata (fitness, ability) of a soul and not on the behaviour and actions exhibited in a lifetime alone.

Problem of Evil

This categorization finds its justification in the problem of evil. The question is who is accountable for the evil in this world? Who is to be blamed for crime, injustice, corruption and other adhArmic activities?
All idealistic doctrines don’t take much notice of this problem, because the reality is not what is perceived. So, the question either takes a backseat or is ignored altogether.
On the other hand, all realistic philosophies are forced to look for a viable solution. This problem is more pronounced with the theistic doctrines because the blame seems to rest with the Lord for either having created these ‘bad’ souls or letting these souls do ‘bad’ work. The former option (as in Christianity) would leave the God guilty of creating either evil souls or such circumstances. The problem would persist even if it were considered that the soul has been given free will and powers to choose a course of action; for, even the choices one makes are determined by, among other factors (which themselves are works of Lord), one’s nature.

On the other hand, Vedanta holds that souls and their intrinsic nature are never created are eternal and are changeless. With that, the problem is either that there are actually bad souls or that the Lord prompts certain unfortunate souls to do bad work. The second option is ruled out by the Vedas, which proclaim that the Lord is absolutely detached in terms of love, affection, hatred and angst. The Brahma-sutras (2.1.34) say that the Lord cannot be accused of the defects of partiality, impropriety or affection towards anyone. In this regard, it should be understand that the Lord, being absolutely impartial, neither attempts to change a soul’s nature nor stops them from performing a misdeed, for, such would imply partiality to ‘bad’ souls.
That leaves us with the unpalatable, but a true, situation that there are actually some tAmasic souls (See Gita, 17.02 which talks of souls having intrinsic nature). The Lord instigates each jIva according to its innate worth, its karmas etc.

Demoralizing theory?

It should be emphasized that the theory of traividhya does not force anyone to be excluded from spiritual pursuits. Despite that, the concept of eternal damnation has been criticized as demeaning and demoralizing. It becomes demoralizing only if one attempts to guess one’s intrinsic nature based on external deeds. This is unwarranted because both past and future actions are not known. Since there is no guarantee that present lifetime’s actions reflect the past in entirety, there is insufficient data to make a reasonable guess.

Given such conditions, it is best to indulge, not in such guesses, instead in performing one’s sAdhana as mentioned in the scriptures. A person excusing himself from doing his sAdhana just because some people are tAmasic in nature has no justification to offer just as a student who does not study just because it is known that some students will fail.

Misleading the wicked?

Also, many a time in Sri Madhva’s philosophy, ‘misleading the wicked’ is adduced as a reason to some specific instances (like Sri Krishna getting ‘killed’ by a hunter or Sri Krishna praying to Rudra for sons, while He Himself was able to create one, without the help of Rukmini and others, in the war-field).

The Lord does nothing extra to mislead the wicked. It’s just that the foolish don’t keep in mind the actual nature of the Lord as mentioned in scriptures, while the sAttvikas do. Both scriptures and experience provide ample evidence for this. There is a story in the Upanishads about both Gods and demons sending their representatives, Indra and Virochana, to learn from Prajapati. They are taught the same thing; but Virochana misinterprets it and he conveys to others that which is totally opposed to the original teaching. Indra, on the other hand, seeks further clarifications and gets the right knowledge. Now, what could be the cause of this difference in understanding, but their intrinsic natures?

4. Sadhana

The aim of this life is to obtain Vishnu’s grace; for it is only Vishnu’s grace that can deliver a soul from bondage. That can be obtained by following one’s varna-ashrama dharma devotedly with a sense of worship to Lord –

svavihita vrittyA bhaktyA bhagavadArAdhana eva paramo dharmah |

All actions should be performed according to one’s varNa and Ashrama in mind. The scriptures are sources of knowledge on what is dharma and what is not. However, the objective in all actions should be to attain Vishnu’s grace, for which, devotion in every dhArmic action is necessary.

Devotion (or Bhakti) to him is ceaseless pure love that arises only after the soul understands the Lord’s magnificent qualities and contemplates on them always to the exclusion of everything else including one’s own self. It should be noted that Jnana (knowledge) and Vairagya (detachment) are essential components of bhakti.

Bhakti without knowledge is blind faith and not sanctioned in the scriptures. There is no shortcut to devotion without knowledge. The scriptures very clearly mention that only the knowledge of Lord can help one attain moksha – taM eva vidvAn.h amrta iha bhavati | nAnyaaH panthA vidyate ayanAya | (There is no other way).

Aparoxa jnAna

This is an important event in the jIva’s sAdhana. The Lord is perceived clearly, without the aid of ‘external’ sensory organs as one’s inner controller. Shrutis such as ‘pashyate rukmavarNam’ confirm that the Jiva perceives the Lord (in a Golden hue) in one’s inner most self. Such an Aparoxa jnAni is ever aware of the presence of Lord in oneself and everything. He/she will take further births to get rid of the prArabdha karma. Moxa is obtained after such prArabdha karma gets accounted for. This is the concept that ‘resembles’ advaitin’s concept of jivanmukta (who will curiously wait for the unreal karma to keep him in unreal samsAra, despite having full knowledge about its unreality), but is far from it.

Moksha

Moksha is enjoyment of bliss intrinsic to one’s nature and the absence of all miseries (This is for ‘mukti-yogya’ souls). This bliss is not external, i.e., it does not come from the Lord or any other source. There is no ‘sharing’ of bliss here.

Merging (after which one loses one’s individuality) with the Brahman is ruled out even by scriptures that advaitins consider as upholding unity. ‘pare avyaye sarve ekIbhavanti’ (they become one in the changeless ‘pare’ ) is one example, where the word, avyaya (changeless; not possible in case of mergers) is ignored.

Moksha can be obtained ONLY through Vishnu’s grace. The scriptures emphasize on different means to Moksha. Some emphasize on knowledge as the sole redeemer (such as in taM evam vidvAn amrita iha bhavati, nAnyaH panthA ayanAya vidyate), some on the role of the Lord in ‘choosing’ the devotee (yaM yevaiSha vRunute tena labhyaH tanUM svAM) (this should also answer questions such as, ‘Who gives the knowledge which is said to be the redeemer in above statements’, ‘Am I independent to obtain knowledge on my own’?), some of the role of bhakti (yasya deve parA bhaktiH) in obtaining liberation.

Tattvavada understands these statements to be giving emphasis on various aspects of a spiritual sAdhana and harmonizes them to conclude that it is unadulterated bhakti (devotion coupled with jnAna and vairAgya (dispassion)) that moves the Lord to shower his grace to a soul.

The difference between the souls from each other and from the Lord exists even in moksha. Liberation is of four-types –

  1. Saalokya or residence in the same place as God
  2. Saamipya or proximity to God
  3. Saaruupya or having the external form like that of God
  4. Saayujya or in a very close association with the Lord.

The type of moksha attained is based on one’s nature. The soul is dependent on the Lord even in moksha for it is Him who enables every soul to enjoy its intrinsic bliss. The soul enjoys all that it wishes and ‘moves around freely as it desires’ (Chandogya Upanishad). However, the bliss it enjoys is infinitesimal compared to that of the Lord.

shrI bhAratIramaNamukhyaprANAntargata shrIkriShNArpaNamastu 1

Tattvavada (Dvaita)

Tattvavada (Dvaita)

(Repost from https://sites.google.com/site/tattvavada/introduction-to-tattvavada )

nArAyaNAya paripUrNaguNarNavAya

vishvodayasthitilayonniyatipradAyakAya

jnAnapradAyavibudhAsurasaukhyaduHkha

satkAraNAya vitatAya namo namaste

 

yo vipralambaviparItamatiprabhUtAn

vAdAnnirasyakritavAn bhuvitattvavAdaM

sarveshvaro haririti pratipAdayantam

Anandatirthamunivaryamaham namAmi

 

Sri Madhvacharya also known as Anandateertha and Poornaprajna is the reviver of this school of Vedanta. The tradition regards him as the third incarnation of MukhyapraaNa – the chief Lord of life (the first two being Hanumanta and Bhima), who is extolled in the RgVeda, the Chandogya, Aitereya and Brihadaaranyaka Upanishads as the ‘shreshTha’ (foremost) among the dieties. The BrihadaraNyaka Upanishad narrates an episode to depict Sri Mukhyaprana’s superiority over other dieties in knowledge and being untouched by the demons (who represent incorrect knowledge). The incarnation of Sri Mukhyaprana as Sri Madhva finds mention not only in the Balittha sUkta (of RgVeda), but also in Garuda, kUrma and skanda purANAs.

 

He was born in 1238CE in a Brahmin family near Udipi, Karnataka and disappeared after seventy-nine years. Information on his life comes from ‘Sumadhva vijaya’, his biography, written by a younger contemporary, Sri Narayana Panditacharya. It describes Sri Madhva’s eventful and interesting life in a poetic and flowery language. A very conscipicuous characteristic of Sri Madhva’s life is that it is ‘vijaya’ everywhere; there is not a single episode where he was subdued, where he had to supress himself or where he had to flee from a tormenting king. His immense intellectual and physical strength is very clearly expressed. His calmness, fearlessness and above all, his unfailing devotion to Lord come out at many instances.

 

Sri Madhva has authored thirty-seven works. All his works carry his characteristic style of writing — a grand salutation to the Supreme Lord Narayana, flawless logic, no flights of reason, brevity and most important of all, interpretations or solutions backed by quotes from a wide array of vedic and puraaNic sources, ending with a salutation to the Lord. Those who study his works can readily attest that the only way to refute his logic is by becoming illogical! Though the logic looks common sense, it’s pretty rigorous and can only be understood with the help of commentaries on them. One another feature in his works is consistency. It will be preposterous to look for any differences of opinion within his works, as is sometimes done with the works of other Acharyas.

 

His works are:

(i) RgBhashya

(ii) Brahma-sutra-bhAShya, aNuvyAkhyAna, nyAyavivaraNa and aNubhAShya (four commentaries on Brahmasutras)

(iii) Gita bhAShya and Gita Tatparya Nirnaya (two on the Bhagavad Gita)

(iv) one commentary on each of the ten Upanishads.

(v) Mahabharata Tatparya Nirnaya

(vi) Bhagavata Tatparya Nirnaya

(vii) daSha prakaraNa (Vishnu-tattva-nirNaya, tattva samkhyAna, tattvodyota, tattva-viveka, pramANa laxaNa, kathA laxaNa, karma nirNaya, upAdhi-khandana, prapancha-mithyatva-anumAna khandana, mayavada khandana)

(viii) dvAdasha stotra, nakha-stuti, krishnAmrta maharNava, jayantI nirNaya, kanduka stuti, tantrasarasangraha, sadAchArasmriti and yati-praNava-kalpa.

 

The RgbhAShya brings out a special facet of Sri Madhva’s philosophy. The Vedas, including the karmakANDa, can be understood at three levels, each pertaining to Adhibhautic, Adhidaivic and AdhyAtmic ideas. The first level of understanding looks upon the verses as dealing with physical and material stuff. The next level (adhidaivic) is when the verses are understood to praise the abhimAni-devatas (indwelling gods) of this material stuff. The highest level is when the scriptures are interpreted as glorifications of the God of the gods, Vishnu. The first forty suktas of the RgVeda are discussed here with the above idea as the principle.

The Brahma-sutra-bhAShya, aNuvyAkhyana and nyAya-vivaraNa, all together, form the commentaries on the Brahma-sutras. Each has a specific purpose and is not superfluous. The same is true of his works on Gita too. In aNuvyAkhyAna, many important concepts on the dvaita philosophy and reasons for their acceptance over other philosophies have been mentioned.

In Mahabharata-tatparya-nirNaya, certain dhArmic ‘puzzles’ are solved. The daShaprakaraNas are polemical works, three of which, collectively known as ‘khaNDana traya’, are refutations on concepts which form the framework of Advaita.

 

Sri Jayatirtha has commented upon most of these works. Sri Jayatirtha is also known as ‘Tikacharya’ (the commentator), a unique feature among commentators. Tradition has it that he was ordained for this purpose. He has brilliantly and more importantly, sincerely rendered the pithy statements of his master, Sri Madhva, in lucid, flowery and simple language. His work, Nyayasudha, is a commentary over Sri Madhva’s aNuvyAkhyana. The importance of contents of this work can be easily guessed by the praise, ‘sudhA va paThanIya, vasudhA va pAlanIya’ — Either (nyAya)sudha should be studied or the earth should be ruled. (This is a variation of a similar line on Patanjali’s mahabhashya).

 

Sri Jayatirtha is followed by Sri Vyaasateertha who is known for brilliant hairsplitting analyses. His important works are works are Tatparyachandrika (a commentary on Jayateertha’s Tattvaprakaashikaa), Nyaayaamrta and Tarka-taandava (a treatise refuting the concepts of Navya nyaaya school). In tatparyachandrika, Sri Vyasatirtha shows how Sri Madhvacharya’s interpretations of the Brahma sutras are better than that of other commentators. In Nyaayamrta, various concepts of Advaita and its interpretations of some shrutivakyas are examined and refuted. Raamaachaarya has written a commentary on Nyaayaamrta called the Tarangini – a response to Madhusudana Saraswati’s Advaita-siddhi; which itself is generally ‘considered’ to be a reply to Nyaayaamrta.

 

Among others, Sri Vadirajatirtha, Sri Raghuttama tirtha and Sri Raghavendra tirtha are well-known. Sri Vadiraja tirtha has many works to his credit; important ones being Yuktimallika and Mahabharatha laxAlankara; wherein one-lakh verses concerned with knotty problems of Mahabharata are explained. Sri Raghuttama tirtha and Sri Raghavendra tirtha are held to be extremely benevolent. What is less known about them, however, is their glosses on Srimad Acharya or Sri Tikacharya’s works. Sri Raghuttama’s ‘brihadAraNyaka-bhAvabodha’ and Sri Raghavendra’s ‘gIta-vivrutti are good examples of the same.

 

More information on the scholars in the tradition can be found at http://www.dvaita.org/scholars

 

A very important section of Sri Madhva’s followers are Haridaasas; Sri Purandara Dasa, one of the founders of Carnatic music, and Sri Vijaya dasa are examples of Haridasas who preached the divine philosophy in a vernacular language – Kannada. The ‘dAsarapada’ (songs of dAsas), when heard properly and ruminated, are extremely effective in shaking one’s excessive attachment to everything else and bringing out devotion in the Lord.

 

Introduction

 

Tattvavada stands out as the unique system based on the hoary tradition of the Vedas, which fulfills all the requirements of intellectual and emotional hunger of the human mind. Having been formally dilineated after the competing systems like Advaita and Vishishtadvaita had already been preached and hardened in their doctrines, it takes into full consideration all their tenets as Purvapakshas (doctrines for examination and refutation), before putting forward its own tenets. Such is easily observable in Sumadhva vijaya. Srimad Acharya writes his Brahma-sutra-bhAShya only after being requested to do so, by the contemporary people, who were thoroughly convinced by the fact that his critiques on other bhAShyas cannot be waved off; in fact, Srimad Acharya’s life was packed with debates, criticism and most importantly, upholding as to why his philosophy is superior.

 

This model of criticisms, debates and disputes within philosophies is, unfortunately, not only missing today, but also generally considered unhealthy and irrelevant to spiritual growth. It is not unusual to observe that many a gurus and babas of today are happy to make high-sounding statements ((like somebody said, ‘Love is the only religion’ or ‘Love is thy nature’) without ever bothering to give pramANAs or exposing one’s doctrine to logic. However, one should not be surprised if such find a lot of acceptance; for, the human ‘weakness’ to feel connected with and related to others is ‘stronger’ than the urge to know the truth. On the other hand, the older generations have given much weightage to debates over philosophies (vAde vAde jAyate jnAnaM).

After all, such disputes are certainly important, especially given the real world and its concerns. If not, then would one have to consider a philosophy that dictated that newborn infants be sacrificed to produce good crops, as also being (possibly) valid? It cannot be held that such absurd or egregrious examples may be excluded without any real analysis at all, because history is replete with examples where such bogus doctrines held wide sway and caused much harm. It is also the case that there are other harmful or incorrect practices in existing systems that proper analysis is essential to repudiate them. For example, animal sacrifice and the cruel treatment of animals is quite widespread in the present day, yet only Srimad Acharya makes the criticism and refutation of such, an essential and cogent part of his system.

 

Unfortunately, such a system is studied not as an independent school of vedanta, but only when as a comparitive doctrine is done. Such dismissal attitude by categorizing any doctrine as a ‘bhakti school of vedanta’ or ‘theistic philosophy’ is, perhaps, based on an impression that theism and philosophy are mutually exclusive. Most of the modern criticizers have unmindfully let their bias feature in their works; the criticism generally being that Srimad Acharya is the odd one out of the group; that his philosophy does not match much with the ‘standard doctrine’ advaita, etc. Such fallacies should only remind us always that it is only harmful to dismiss or excessively favour any doctrine, based on one’s presuppositions and biases for a particular achArya or a doctrine, even if it is science.

 

That is where Tattvavada differs. All the first principles are completely justified, not on beliefs of the day, but on rational grounds. A sample can be seen in Srimad Acharya’s treatment of an important topic: the existence of soul as diffrent from body. Unless such is proven, all spiritual pursuits would have no utility. Srimad Acharya establishes, on a logical basis, what would be either brushed off or blindly accepted as true. While most of the religions hold that soul to be responsible for activating the body, science believes that it is the ever-active brain to be the cause. In the latter case, there needs to be no ‘pursuit’ at all, for, there is nothing, be it Heaven or moksha, remaining after death to enjoy the benefits of such pursuits.

 

In his first work, Gita Bhashya, Srimad Acharya brings up this subject when commenting on the verses 2.12 and 2.13 of Gita. The soul as different from the body needs to be postulated because while the body changes, the experiencer/observer of these changes does not. But, why shouldn’t it be held that brain or mind is the experiencer who also ‘dies in death’? Brain/Mind cannot be the experiencer itself because, in ‘mUrccha’ (unconscious state) and in dreamless sleep (suShupti), there is no experience (of ‘I’-ness), though the mind is active. So, the experiencer is somebody else and that is the jIva. Further reasons are adduced, but the point is that the stuff the body is made of and the qualities seen in the soul, such as consciousness (self-awareness), indivisibility, ability to have feelings, do not match.

 

Please note that the above is a very simplistic explanation. The original and Sri Jayatirtha’s commentary on the same should be looked into for a more thorough and professional treatment of the subject.

 

Pramaanas

 

Tattvavada considers that there are three (anu) pramANAs (three sources of knowledge) – flawless perception, flawless inference and flawless verbal testimony. The prAbhAkaras and advaitins hold that there are three more pramANas, but such are shown to be special cases of inference.

 

In the last category, the Vedas, Mahabharata, Mula-ramayana (different from Valmiki Ramayana) and Pancharatraas are held as authoritative.

 

But then why should scriptures be accepted as authoritative? [Edited this section on 4th July 2009, Instead pls see the link: apauruSheyatva of Vedas].

 

It may be wondered if such is the nature of vedic literature — with mutually contradicting statements, tthat Shankaracharya is trying to reconcile in his own way. Whether there are any contradicting statements or not is an issue discussed later, but the direction which the advaita-acharya is keen about, is definitely incorrect. An alternative to his way of reconciling by denigrating the status of a good chunk of scriptures as ‘non-truth telling’, is a positive and uniform approach. And that is supported by scriptures. See, in this regard, the Aitereya Aranyaka 2.2.2 (which says that it should be understood that all the vedas, all the sounds (ghoSha) laud the Supreme Prana) or the Katha Upanishad statement, ‘**sarve vedaa** yatpadamAmananti’. The Brahmasutras 1.1.4 and 1.1.10 and the beloved Bhagavad Gita’s dictum, ‘vedaishcha **sarvaih** aham eva vedyo’ support the idea.

 

After justifying the unquestionable authority to the apaurusheya vedas(shruti), Srimad Acharya attributes ‘conditional authority’ to all ancillary texts such as the smritis, purANAs, itihAsa (mahabharata). They are considered authoritative as long as they do not contradict the vedas.

 

Sri Madhvacharya holds Pancharatras as authoritative; unlike Shankaracharya. The Mahabharata (moksha parva) praises them (in comparision to the doctrines of sAnkhya, yoga and pAShupatas) as being narrated by the Lord Narayana Himself and that these contain ‘shreShTha jnAna’ (excellent knowledge). The statements such as ‘the Jiva was created’ are interpreted by Shankaracharya in a straightforward way, and hence considers them anti-vedic. (However, the same standard is not maintained when ‘asatah sad ajAyata’ — from the unreal was the real born — Taitt.Up) is interpreted). On the other hand, these are explained as ‘udbhava of samkarshana form of the Lord’ and all anti-vedicness is removed.

 

Priorities of pramANAs: Each pramANA has a particular scope and domain, within which it can be considered a pramANa. Pratyaksha (perception) can function as a pramANa in the matters of perceptible entities. It has to subscribe to the shruti in the matters of atIndriya (supra-sensory) entities like God, dharma and adharma. Likewise, Shruti cannot overrule experience. “na cha anubhavavirodhe Agamasya prAmANyaM’. So, if shruti directs that the emotions and feelings experienced have to be considered illusory or that they will be proved so later, the shruti has to be either summarily discarded or interpreted in some other way.

 

In case of inference, stray logic should be avoided. Logical deductions have to be substantiated by either experience or shruti, in the absence of which the deduction should be considered a hypothesis.

 

Pratyaksha (perception) has a high place as an instrument of knowledge because of its uniqueness in terms of immediacy and spontaniety. An objection can be raised that pratyaksha is known to fail as a pramANa in the cases of erroneous perceptions, such as mirages, snake mistook as rope. Why is that this inherent weakness is forgotten when glorifying pratyaksha?

 

Here, it is being forgotten that it is only ‘flawless’ perception that is counted as pramANa (See K.Narain’s Critique of Madhva’s refutation of Shankara’s Advaita). This adjective ‘flawlessness’ is applied in case of other pramANAs too. The question of how in the first place this flawlessness (or validity) is determined takes us to the concept of ‘svatah prAmANya’.

 

The question here is pertinent to any branch of knowledge. How does one apprehend the validity of knowledge obtained through some source of knowledge? Generally a test is conducted to know if certain knowledge is correct or not. But that would not help us in any way; for, the accuracy (validity) of this test needs to be separately apprehended with the aid of yet another test. Thus, it can be easily seen that it is a never ending process (infinite regress – anAvasthA) if one were to depend solely on tests (Notice that this is a problem that science has not focussed on). However, it is not that validity has never been apprehended at all. Consider the case of knowledge of self, ‘I-ness’. This is known as valid and so, at all times. Never was a test instituted to verify whether ‘I-ness’ exists or not.

 

Given that validity of valid knowledge is apprehensible, the question remains as to when it is apprehended. This apprehension happens either at the time of perception itself (i.e. time of reception of knowledge itself) or at a later date. The latter option has the same fallacy of verification through tests (of one perception being validated by second perception, which in turn needs to be validated by a third one, so on and forth). Thus, it is that knowledge and its validity are known in the same instant itself, for, knowledge carries its own validity. In other words, validity is intrinsic to knowledge (svatah prAmANya). (The sentence ‘apaurusheyatvam cha svata eva siddham’ has to be seen in this light also.)

 

The above passages discuss the possibility of comprehending validity, the question of who is responsible for apprehending this validity still remains. The answer to this question is one of the important contributions to philosophy.  The need for the existence of an entity cannot be undermined; for whatever be the doctrine, dvaita or advaita or atheism, there has to be some entity which will validate it. How do we know that all these theories are stable and hold good always unlike science, which comes up with a new theory frequently.

Definitely it is not the mind or brain which can be held responsible for grasping the validity of particular knowledge, because it is does not grasp the invalidity in erroneous perceptions. “Sakshi” is the being which apprehends both knowledge and its validity. It is the cognizing agent of the soul. It validates even the knowledge of entities such as space, time al (whichever Immanuel Kant defines as apriori knowledge AND the numerical theorems).

But then, if there exists something like ‘sAkshi’ which percieves the validity of knowledge and being a part of the soul, if it is ever active, why then was such a big argument given in favor of apaurusheyatva. No valid theory would ever need justification. The moment a theory is put forward, the sAkshi would percieve it to be valid; if it doesn’t, that theory is wrong. And the same holds good for this concept of ‘sAkshi’ itself. Since one is not convinced immediately of existence of such sAkshi, the concept invalidates itself — such is a possible objection. The answer to the objection is that it is that sAkshi comprehends only the knowledge and not its validity if there are any flaws of intellect. The moment, these flaws of intellect are removed, prAmANya is grasped. Once ‘approved’ by the sAkshi, such knowledge can never be sublated. For example, no amount of logic or any future experience can ever sublate the knowledge of one’s own experience of happiness. Here it is easy to see why ‘advaita’ (which accepts a single thoughtless consciousness as the final reality; for ‘who’ will be ‘convinced’ of such a ‘state’) is rejected. There have been many objections to this theory of sAkshi-pratyaksha. They are all based on the confusion between sAkshi-pratyaksha (cognitions of the sAkshi) that never errs and manas-pratyaksha that is liable to err.

 

The Doctrine (Hari sarvottamatva)

 

The first and foremost tenet is that of the absolute independence of Vishnu, who is set apart from everything else on the basis of this quality. Thus, we have two categories, independent and dependent. Thus dvaita talks of svatantra and paratantra, unlike the dualism of Western philosophy, which speaks in terms of mind and matter. Also, dvaita has been generally spoken of as constituting two reals; which is not the case. Dvaita hold not one or two entities to be real, but many of them; all of them dependent on one Supreme real, in the words of Katha Upanishad, the ‘real of reals’, Sri Narayana.

 

Vishnu is the Supreme Lord and knowable only with the aid of the flawless scriptures. He has infinite virtues, each virtue itself being infinite in magnitude. He experiences infinite untarnished bliss, possesses knowledge of everything to the minutest detail, has energy and powers that are beyond the limits of thought of the greatest human intellect. He is never touched by even the slightest blemish such as dependence, misery etc. He is never comprehensible completely by anybody except Himself. He is the only independent being who exercises complete, absolute and thorough control over all aspects of all souls and insentient matter at all points of time.

 

He is the only being who is the primary referrent of all words (and sounds). This is understandable (to an extent) because he is the origin of all the virtues in all the devatAs and the source of all activity. Aitereya Aranyaka and Upanishad are important sources for this concept. Sri Madhva explains this concept in detail in his Brahma-sutra-bhAShya and shows how a beatific harmonization of all scriptural (even seemingly self-contradictory) statements can be done to conclude the unconditional supremacy of Lord Vishnu.

 

He explains how the word ‘Brahman’ refers to Vishnu only. This might seem surprising because there are many scriptural statements that praise Rudra (Sri Rudram), Indra, Agni (many places in the vedas) and other gods. However, can one go just by the names mentioned in the mantras and conclude that monotheism is not the purport? That cannot be done because the scriptures themselves state that it is only ONE being who is extolled in so many ways and that He who is the ‘bearer’ of all names is only one (like ‘yo devAnAM namadhA eka eva’). Also, the nAsadIya sukta is very clear that there is a single being who is the source of all beings.

Sri Madhva identifies this being with Lord Narayana on the basis of ‘linga’ (indicative marks). In this regard, the following three quotes are significant:

 

The ‘ambhraNI sUkta’ (from RgVeda) where the diety speaks of her prowess in making a person brahma, Rudra or a sage or a wise man, as she pleases. It is her who makes ‘Rudra cut off the head of Brahma’. At the end of it, she indicates the source of powers to be ‘the Being on the ocean’.

Bhallaveya shruti says, “nAmAni sarvAni yamAvishanti taM vai vishhNuM paramamudAharanti”, which extolls Vishnu is the Supreme Being who is primarily and invariably conveyed by all the words.

The RkSamhita talks of the worlds as being present in a lotus which itself is in the navel of the ‘unborn’ — ‘ajasya nAbhaAvadhyekamarpitaM yasminvishvA bhuvanAni tasthuH’

The speciality of these quotes is such qualities that identify Vishnu uniquely AND that are known generally, are mentioned. The first quote is an important one, for it answers  many objections to Supremacy of Vishnu. In Sri Rudram, Rudra is praised as Supreme Lord. The referrent therein is also praised with indicative marks such as, ‘neelakaNTa’ (blue-necked). Thus it must be Shiva who is the Supreme — such can be an objection. The answer to this lies in the first quote. Sri Lakshmi is said to bestow on him, his very qualities of Rudratva. ( A Similar stance occurs in RgVeda.7th — asya devasya mILhuSo vayA viSNoreSasya prrabhRthe havirbhiH | vide hi rudro rudriyaM mahitvaM yAsiShTaM vartirashvinAvirAvat || ) This verse is also the reason why Sri Rudram has to be interpreted in a different way (with Vishnu as the antaryAMi of Shiva) to suit the meaning of ambhraNi-sukta and not the other way around.

A detailed discussion on this can be found in Sri Madhvacharya’s Brahma-sutra-bhAShya and Sri Jayatirtha’s commentary on the same.

 

One important point to note here is regarding the interpretation of the word ‘Atma’ according to Sri Madhvacharya. While the word is generally interpreted as ‘self’ (referring the jIva), Sri Madhvacharya takes the context into account and interprets it (in most of the places) as Lord Narayana. Interestingly, even Shankaracharya while commenting on the Brahmasutra 1.3.1 (which says that the being referred by the word ‘Atma’ is the support of this entire cosmos) says that the word ‘Atma’ primarily refers to the Paramatma and not the jIva. See in this regard the statement in Brihadaaranyaka Upanishad — yo Atmani tiShThan AtmAnaM antaro yamayati, esha te atmA — He who is in the ‘Atma’ and controls the ‘Atma’ from within is the AntaryAmi is your ‘AtmA’ (mAdhyandina shAkhA, antaryAmi brAhmaNa). This is a good example to note that the conventional meaning does not hold well always.

 

Sri Lakshmi

 

She is the Eternal consort of Sri Narayana and the presiding diety of the entire insentient matter. She possesses an in-destructible and extremely subtle body (axara). She is also untouched by blemishes such as misery. However she is not independent and is considered the best devotee of the Lord.

Sri Madhva interprets the word ‘axara’ (indestructible) that appears in many upanishads and Bhagavad-Gita as referring to Sri Lakshmi. This interpretation is backed by quotes from Samaveda and other purANAs. One of the meanings attached to the word, ‘mAyA’ is Lakshmi devi.

 

Creation

 

The Lord is the creator, preserver and destroyer and dispenser of other functions of the universe. He is only an efficient cause in the creation, i.e., that He is like a potter who does not transform Himself to create a pot; instead creates a pot out of clay, without Himself not undergoing any modification. The equivalent of clay in this case is the mUla prakriti — insentient matter, out of which the universe is created and into which the universe dissolves. Creation is only modification of this prakriti, from its subtle state to more manifested grosser evolutes. The ever-benevolent Lord undertakes this creation because it is his nature to create. He has nothing to benefit from this creation; for what can a being who has nothing left to be fulfilled(AptakAma) ever want (kA spriha)? The Brahmasutras say that this world has been the created for the benefit of worthy souls (and this is the expression of Lord’s benevolence).

 

Reality of world

 

The world is real because there is no pramANa either (i) contradicting it or (ii) supporting the contrary.

 

However, there are some doctrines that opine that the world is not real, is illusory. A slightly different flavor of the same doctrine is that there is no external reality to this world and it exists in the consciousness.

 

Let’s analyse them. First and foremost, there is no pramana supporting the same. Pratyaksha (perception) does not deny the reality of this world. Moreover, nobody has ever had the experience of world disappearing. Inferences concluding with such are shown to be faulty (see ‘prapancha-mithyatva-anumaana-khandana). Such are of the nature, ‘This world is ‘mithya’ on the account of it being percieved, being limited etc, just like the silver in the nacre’ (Shankaracharya on Gaudapada karika, 2.4). Twelve different fallacies are pointed out (one being as simple as the possibility of forumalation of a stronger and opposing syllogism – The world is real, for it is percieved.) Also, such is opposed to scriptures – vishvam satyam (RgVeda) and in Gita, 16.8 (where it is said that demonaic people consider this world to be ‘asatyam’). Moreover, ‘Atman’, the ultimate goal of Advaita, has to be perceptible else how would one know whether the goal has been achieved or not. If it is conceded as perceptible, it also should be held illusory. (More on such later in comparision with other doctrines).

 

The basic flaw is that these doctrines equate ‘eternality’ and ‘reality’. The argument in short is this: Given the illusory experience of a snake in the rope, how does one characterize the real? How is it different from the unreal? How does one know that the objects percieved at present are real and will not vanish later? It is only such objects that never vanish or rather; such that always exist is real. A corollary of this is that anything changes is not real.

 

It is easy to see that the point missed here is that even the ‘real’ rope was not percieved when the snake was percieved. So, does that make the rope unreal? In Advaitic terms, the ‘nirguNa Brahman’ (which is the ultimate reality) should have been unreal because it is not perceptible at present. But if it were to be said that nirguNa Brahman exists always, though not perceived, the criterion for reality has to be changed; i.e., that which exists, even if not always, is real.

 

According to tattvavada, that is real which is an object of valid cognition and is not superimposed. The validity of cognition is known by the sAkshi. At this point, it should be clarified that this concept of ‘sAkshi’ is not just in theory, but is seen in action too. In the given instance of ‘rope mistook as snake’ or the sea-shell mistook as silver, how does one even know that the rope/sea-shell is for real, while the snake or silver is unreal and not the other way around? How does one even know that the rope/sea-shell  is the substratum on which the snake/silver  was percieved and not the other way around?

 

Consider the above example of sea-shell mistook as silver. Contrast this with a situation where a silver article, say a silver vessel, has been displaced when the observer was not looking. In both situations, silver is not percieved later. However, it is only in the first situation that nobody searches for the now-not-perceptible silver, unlike the second situation where the observer is prompted to search for the same. Why is there this difference of reactions when the end result is same?

It should be admitted that this knowledge of rope as real in contrast to the snake is known quite intuitively. And only because it is the sAkshi who percieves this and validates the same to be true, no further questions are asked about which of rope and snake are real.

 

And in case of this world, there is the simplest problem that nobody ever has had the experience of this world disappearing. Even if that be the case, it is only likely that the person starts searching for it instead of philosophizing about its illusoriness.

 

Souls

 

There are infinite souls, each atomic in size and ever dependent on the Lord. They are of three kinds: mukti-yogya (who are fit for liberation), nitya-samsaarinaH (ever-transmigrating) and tamo-yogya (damnable). This categorization is based on intrinsic yogyata (fitness, ability) of a soul and not on the behaviour and actions exhibited in a lifetime alone.

 

This categorization finds its justification not only logically, but scripturally too. In this regard, a look at the problem of evil, which has always stupified all philosophies — both idealistic and realistic — is necessary. The question is who is accoountable for the evil in this world? Who is to be blamed for crime, injustice and corruption?

All idealistic doctrines don’t take much notice of this problem, because the reality for them, generally, is not what is percieved. Since the sin or crime percieved is not what is present in reality, quite obviously so, the question either takes a backseat or is ignored.

On the other hand, all realistic philosophies are forced to look for a viable solution. While the non-theistic ones talk in terms of ‘bad factors’ affecting the ‘doer’ either temporarily or permanently as a solution, the theistic ones are not so lucky because the blame rests with the Lord for either having created these ‘bad’ souls or letting these souls do ‘bad’ work.

The problem turns trouble when one accepts that souls were created out of nothing at all by the Lord. In such cases, to quote Omar Khayyam, it should be the Lord who should be punished instead of the sinning person. It should be the Lord who should be put in Hell on the D-Day and not the poor soul. If it were to be answered that the soul has been given free will and powers to choose a course of action, still the problem would persist. Generally the choices and decisions one makes is a product of one’s upbringing, birth, social and economic situations one is in. What makes a difference here is the reaction to such situations in terms of attitude and perseverance. And the reaction or a response is an output of one’s nature, among other factors (which themselves are works of Lord). And since it is the Lord who has created a soul with a particular nature, He should be blamed.

Vedanta holds that souls are never created. They are eternal. Their nature, which is intrinsic to them, is also eternal. In other words, a soul’s intrinsic nature never changes, thanks to God.

With this, evil or sin can be traced to two sources: (i) the Lord for having created situations which forced a soul to sin and, moreover, letting the soul commit the misdeed (ii) the soul itself. Since the first option talks something about God, we have to look at scritpures to provide an answer; for, it is only the unauthored scriptures that can give us any knowledge of God and his dealings.  Now, what do the scriptures say in this regard? That the Lord is absolutely detached. What does this ‘detachment’ mean? Complete detachment not only in terms of love and affection to anybody in particular, but even in terms of hatred, angst and animosity. This is plausible because, otherwise, the Lord cannot be held ‘independent’ in all aspects and blissful always. The Brahma-sutras (2.1.34) say, in this regard, that the Lord cannot be accused of the defects of partiality, impropriety or affection towards anyone. He is absolutely impartial. In this regard, it needs to be noted that it is because of this impartiality that the Lord niether attempts to change a soul’s nature, for had he done so, he can be accused of being partial to ‘bad’ souls nor stops them from performing a misdeed.

With the Lord being out of question, it should be the man that is responsible for evil. Both scriptures and experience provide ample evidence for this. There is a story in the Upanishads about both Gods and demons sending their representatives, Indra and Virochana, to learn from Prajapati. They are taught the same thing; but Virochana misinterprets it and something totally opposed to the original teaching is conveyed to other demons. Indra, on the other hand, seeks more clarifications and gets the right knowledge. Now, what could be the cause of this difference in understanding, but their intrinsic natures?

 

See the Gita, 17.02.

trividhA bhavati shraddhA dehinAm sA **svabhAvajA**

sAttvikI rAjasI caiva tAmasI ceti tAm shRuNu

Which talks of the ‘dehinAm’ (the embodied, i.e. the souls) having three types of ‘shraddhA’, which itself is a characteristic of their nature.

 

Also, many a time in Sri Madhva’s philosophy, ‘misleading the wicked’ is adduced as a reason to some specific instances (like Sri Krishna getting ‘killed’ by a hunter or Sri Krishna praying to Rudra for sons, while He Himself was able to create one, without the help of Rukmini and others, in the war-field). This needs to be carefully understood. The Lord does nothing extra for the wicked. It’s just that the foolish won’t keep in mind the actual nature of the Lord as mentioned in scriptures, while the sAttvikas will. The foolish think that the Lord’s body is made of material stuff (to justify his getting killed) despite the Lord’s warning in Gita, that He is no ordinary mortal. A beautiful example is when the Lord Krishna shows his Vishvarupa when he goes to Kaurava camp for peace-negotiations. While the elders of the Kuru family, forgetting their prejudices and obligations, stand up at the spectacular sight in all humility and devotion, Duryodhana tells Krishna that he(Duryodhana) is aware of the Lord’s drama! Elsewhere in Mahabhaarata, Duryodhana himself admits that he cannot act in opposition to his own nature.

 

Often, this concept of eternal damnation has been criticized as demeaning and demoralizing. However, one needs to understand that it is demeaning or demoralizing to those who attempt to guess their intrinsic nature based on external deeds. This is not warranted because of atleast two reasons: ‘intrinsic nature’ is just one of the factors that determine the actions. When there is lack of knowledge of the other factors and their weightages, guessing or estimating is not warranted. Secondly, both past and future actions are not known. Since there is no guarantee that present lifetime’s actions reflect the past in entirety, there is insufficient data to make a reasonable guess. Given such conditions, it is best not to indulge in such guesses, instead in performing one’s saadhana as mentioned in the scriptures. A person excusing himself from doing his sAdhana just because some people are tAmasic in nature has no justification to offer just as a student who does not study just because it is known that some students will fail.

 

That all don’t reach the same place is clearly mentioned in Gita itself:

UrdhvaM gachchhanti sattvasthA madhye tishhThanti rAjasAH  |

jaghanya guNavR^ittisthA adho gachchhanti tAmasAH  ||

Upwards (to liberation) go those situated in sattva; the rAjasa-s stay in the middle; those situated in abominable qualities and deeds, the tâmasa-s, go to the lowest state.

Another instance is the Ishavasya Upanishad which bestows eternal hell who worship the Lord in an incorrect manner.

 

Panchabheda

 

Vishnu is ever different from any soul; two souls from each other always; any soul from insentient matter and two elements of insentient prakriti from each other. These differences never merge or evaporate and are eternal. Though matter and souls co-exist with God and are real, they are so because of God’s wish (Bhagavata).

 

There is a gradation among them and it is seen in not only the sAdhana performed but also in the intrinsic knowledge possessed and intrinsic bliss experienced by a soul in moksha. The souls are bound from beginningless time and have beginningless ignorance about the Lord and their own selves. The Lord in accordance with the souls’ instrinsic nature and anAdi karmas guides the souls through their journey.

 

Sadhana

 

The aim of this life is to obtain Vishnu’s grace; for it is only Vishnu’s grace that can deliver a soul from bondage. That can be obtained when one follows one’s varna-ashrama dharma devotedly with a sense of worship to Lord (svavihita vrittyA bhaktyA bhagavad ArAdhana eva paramo dharmah). Devotion (or Bhakti) to him is ceaseless pure love that arises only after the soul understands the Lord’s magnificient qualities and contemplates on them always to the exclusion of everything else including one’s own self. This knowledge of Him has to be obtained from a Guru not only to be effective, but also to be of any use.

 

Moksha

 

Moksha is enjoyment of bliss intrinsic to one’s nature and the absence of all miseries (This is for ‘mukti-yogya’ souls). This bliss is not external, i.e., it does not come from the Lord. There is no ‘sharing’ of bliss here.

Moksha can be obtained ONLY through Vishnu’s grace and mercy. His grace is obtained by being devoted to him and his devotees, the most important being Mukhyaprana. When such devotion is achieved, the Lord gives the jIva aparoxa-jnaana; after which the soul will be always aware of the Lord’s presence IN himself without the aid of external cognitions. Moksha is assured to such an aparoxa jnAni.

The difference between the souls from each other and from the Lord exists even in moksha. Liberation is of four-types — (a) Saalokya or residence in the same place as God, 2. Saamipya or proximity to God, 3. Saaruupya or having the external form like that of God and 4. Saayujya or in a very close association with the Lord. The type of moksha attained is based on one’s nature. The soul is dependent on the Lord even in moksha for it is Him who enables every soul to enjoy its intrinsic bliss. The soul enjoys all that it wishes and ‘moves around freely as it desires’ (Chandogya Upanishad). However, the bliss it enjoys is infinitesimal compared to that of the Lord.

 

Comparision with other doctrines

 

Sri Madhva comes down forcefully on any doctrine that is contradictory to scriptures.

Advaita:

Advaita’s structural framework comprising concepts such as sadasadvailakshanya, upAdhi, saguNa/nirguNa brahmans are examined in detail and rejected not only on logical grounds but also on scriptural bases. He shows how advaita and Buddhism are the anti-vedic twin doctrines.

 

VishishtAdvaita:

While Vishishtadvaita posits a relation of ‘aprithaksiddha’ between the Lord and His attributes (non-separability), Sri Madhva explains the relation as vishesha-visheshya bhAva (‘colorful’ identity between the qualified and the quality). Sri Vyasatirtha explains in nyAyamrta how the latter is not only better, but also more attuned to scriptural statements like ‘neha naanaasti kinchana’ (there is no difference here whatsoever — referring to the vyUha forms of Lord wherre different attributes of the Lord are highlighted in each vyUha form).

Among the important differences, the one that should be noted is that Sri Madhvacharya does not approve the concept of prapatti (which involves devotion without the necessity of knowledge) (tameva **vidvAn** amrta iha bhavati).

 

Achintyabheda-abhedavAda (Gaudiya)

Though this doctrine looks very similar to dvaita, it is only superficial similarity. Concepts such as differences in avataaras of Lord (Krishna is more powerful than Vishnu), existence of Radha and many others are rejected by Sri Madhva (much before Chaitanya took birth).

 

Shri madhvesha krishnarpanamastu

347th Raghavendra Swamy Aradhane Video Gallery

347th RAGHAVENDRA SWAMY ARADHANA MAHOTSAVA 2018

||  श्री मूलरामो विजयते  ||      

             

II  हरि:सर्वोत्तम II                                       II  वायु:जीवोत्तम II

 

पूज्याय राघवेन्द्राय सत्यधर्मरताय च ।

भजतां कल्पवृक्षाय नमतां कामधेनवे ॥

SREE GURURAJA SEVA SAMITHI

Established in 1984

Theertham Village, Baireddipalle Mandal, Chittoor District, Andhra Pradesh, India.

PIN Code -517415

 

I N V I T A T I O N

347th RAGHAVENDRA SWAMY ARADHANA MAHOTSAVA 2018

POORVARADHANA

MONDAY, 27TH AUGUST 2018

MADHYARADHANA

TUESDAY, 28TH AUGUST 2018

UTTARARADHANA

WEDNESDAY, 29TH AUGUST 2018

At Sri Vyasaraja Pratishtita Mukhyaprana Devaru,

Sri Raghavendra Swamy Brindavana Sannidhi, Theertham

 

ALL ARE CORDIALLY INVITED

 

ARADHANE 2018 EVENTS @ SGSS
27-08-2018 Raghavendra Vijaya Parayane by Mahila Mandali 9.30 AM to 11 AM
Pravachana by Sri. K. Bheema Rao, Baireddipalle 11 AM to 12 Noon
Raghavendra Stutis parayana 6:00 PM
28-08-2018 Sree Sumadhwa Vijaya Parayane by Sree Sumadhwa Vijaya Parayana Seva Sangha, Girinagar, Bangalore. 9 AM to 12 Noon
Pravachana by Sree T S Madhusudhana Rao, Chennai 12 Noon to 12.30 PM
Raghavendra Stutis parayana 6:00 PM
29-08-2018 Pravachana by Sree Pradeepachar, Akshayanagar Mutt Bangalore. 10:30 AM to 12 Noon
Raghavendra Stutis parayana 6:00 PM

 

APPEAL TO DEVOTEES

As part of the Jeernoddhara of the Anjaneya Swamy temple, we have completed the Garbha gudi, main temple hall renovation activities and performed Kumbabhisheka in March 2016. By the Grace of Sri Hari Vayu Gurugalu, the temple committee is planning to take up the construction of Yagashala and first-floor hall with accommodation and bathrooms for the devotees who wish to stay in the temple for performing sevas and rituals. In this regard, we appeal to all the devotees of Sri Mukhya Prana Devaru and Sri Raghavendra Swamy to whole heartedly support us and liberally donate towards this.

 

Donations/Contributions for Aradhana sevas as mentioned in the list and Building Fund (mentioned above) may please be sent through our members inviting you or directly to Sri Gururaja Seva Samithi, Theertham, Baireddipalle Mandal, Chittoor District – 517 415 by a crossed cheque / DD / M.O or by online transfer (NEFT/IMPS/UPI) to our account. Devotees making online payment are requested to contact or furnish their details by SMS message to the Secretary.

ALL DONORS ARE REQUESTED TO COLLECT OFFICIAL RECEIPTS AND RAYARA PRASADA

BANK ACCOUNT DETAILS

  1. Bank Name – Indian Bank

Branch – BAIREDDIPALLI CHITTOOR 517415

IFSC Code: IDIB000B003

Account Number – 560731930

  1. Bank Name – State Bank of India

Branch – Palamaner

IFSC Code: SBIN0021529

Account Number – 62422449808

Notes for Sevakartas:

  1. To be present before 11.00 AM on the seva day with madi panche.
  2. To perform Pada Pooje to Alankara Pankthi Brahmanaru, seva kartas have to take bath in the holy water from the temple well.
  3. Dress Code: Men to wear Dhoti (Preferably in Kache) and Angavastra, Women in traditional Saree.

For more details / information please visit our website: www.theertham.org or contact the following Committee Members.

D Y Muralidhara Rao, Bangalore

President

Mob: 9900587215

dymrao@gmail.com

S Anandateertha Rao, Palamaner

Vice-President

Mob: 9441436517

satrao@gmail.com satrao@gmail.com

S Srinivasa Murthy, Palamaner

Secretary

Mob: 9492605452

ssmurthy.suswaram@gmail.com

T.S.  Madhusudhan Rao, Chennai

Mob: 9444782160

raomadhusudana03@gmail.com

S Gopalakrishna Murthy, Chennai

Mob: 85899 04389

H K Mohana Rao, Theertham

Mob: 9642133194

S Ramesh, Theertham

Mob: 94414511745

ramaesha@gmail.com

Raghu Achar, Theertham

Mob : 94917 71945

raghususwaram@gmail.com

D Praveen, Bangalore

Mob:9886760696

praveen.dharma@gmail.com

LOCATION

Theertham village is located approximately 120 kms from Bangalore and takes about 3 hours of travel time and 20 km from Mulabagal. Govt. Buses and Private vehicles are available to reach this place. Nearest railway station to Theertham is Kuppam (KPN) and Chittoor railway station (CTO) who travel from HYD/Kurnool.

Different routes to reach Theertham village from Bangalore/Chennai/Tirupati.

  1. Bangalore – Hosakote – Kolar – Mulabagal – Theertham.
  2. Chennai – Tirupati – Chittoor – Palamaner – Baireddipalle – Theertham.
  3. Chennai – Kuppam (Train) – V.Kota – Devadoddi – Theertham.

SEVA LIST

SRI GURURAJA SEVA SAMITHI
POORVARADHANA SEVA (27-AUG-2018)  ₹   5,000.00
MADHYARADHANA SEVA (28-AUG-2018)  ₹   8,000.00
UTTARARADHANA SEVA (29-AUG-2018)  ₹   5,000.00
SARVA SEVA  ₹   1,500.00
ALANKARA SEVA  ₹   1,000.00
HASTHODAKA  ₹      200.00
PANCHAMRUTHA ABHISHEKA  ₹      200.00
PADA POOJA  ₹      200.00